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THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE
CONFINED: ACCESS TO THE COURTS AND
COUNSEL
ELDON

D. WEDLOCK*

Prisoners generally seek judicial remedies either to object to
conditions of confinement-general or individual-or to secure
relief from the execution of their sentences, usually on the basis
of some error of law. But rights without the means of enforcement
are empty; and although there is no constitutional language
which explicitly states that prisoners have a right to free access
to the courts, such a right has been judicially inferred from
sources in the Constitution. Primarily, the right of access to the
courts has been seen as included in the Due Process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,' and by similar limitations on state governments by similar clauses in the respective state constitutions.
Generally speaking, however, the source of the right of access
to the courts has not been much discussed. For the most part it
has merely been acknowledged by the United States Supreme
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. This research was conducted under a grant to the South Carolina Department of Corrections from the National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice (*NI-70-048). This article reflects portions
of THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE

CONFINED

(available from the Correctional Development

Foundation, P.O. Box 752, Columbia, S.C. 29202) co-authored by Professor Wedlock
pursuant to the terms of the research grant. The conclusions drawn and the positions
taken in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the South Carolina Department
of Corrections or the United States Department of Justice.
1. Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963); Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 273 (7th
Cir. 1963); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961); Groom v. Hert, 405 P.2d
125 (Okla. 1965); Austin v. Hert, 405 P.2d 126 (Okla. 1965). Some cases suggest that the
right of state prisoners to have access to the courts might flow from the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942), wherein
the Supreme Court assented to the stipulation that if the prison officials had prevented
petitioner from appealing his conviction, it would be a denial of equal protection. In 1951
Cochranwas clarified by Dowd v. United States ex ret. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951), in which
Cochran was cited for the proposition that a discriminatory denial of a statutory right of
appeal was a denial of equal protection. In Cook, as in Cochran, the prevention of the
appeal was alleged to have been the cause of prison officials acting pursuant to prison
rules. Some recent cases have expressed the view that communications with courts via
the mails in a First Amendment right, whether of free expression or to petition for redress
of grievances. Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971); Palmigiano v.
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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Court: "It is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts
for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied
or obstructed,"'2 or simply declared by the lower federal courts:
"A right of access to the courts is one of the rights a prisoner
clearly retains. It is a precious right and its administrative unfettered exercise may be of incalculable importance to the protection of rights more precious. '" 3 These simple expressions, though
probably unassailable at this time, leave a wide variety of questions unanswered. What type of "access" is required? What is
denial or obstruction of access? What restrictions, while justifiable in general, must fall because they deny or obstruct access to
the courts? What exceptions must be built into prison regulations
to avoid collision with this right and when does administrative
regulation begin to "fetter" the right of access to the courts?
These and other questions will be the focus of this article.
I.

PREVENTING COMMUNICATIONS WITH COURTS

The most obvious form'of obstruction of the right of access
to the courts is the absolute refusal of the prison officials to allow
an inmate to communicate with the courts by refusing to mail his
letters. This practice has been uniformly condemned 4 as a denial
of access to the courts, and prisoners have been held entitled to
relief if such interference can be factually established. 5 In
Cochran v. Kansas6 the United States Supreme Court heard a
plea requesting that Kansas give the petitioner a hearing to determine if in fact his appeal from conviction had been frustrated by
prison regulations. The state agreed that had the petitioner's direct appeal been blocked by administrative regulations that prevented him from filing his appeal, the petitioner would have suffered a denial of equal protection.
The Kansas Supreme Court, however, had refused to grant
petitioner a hearing in order to establish the factual basis for the
charge, thus precluding him from obtaining any relief from his
allegedly unconstitutional treatment. The United States Supreme Court ordered the hearing.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1966).
Brabson v. Wilkins, 25 App. Div. 2d 610, 267 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
But see State ex rel. Jacobs v. Warden, 190 Md. 755, 59 A.2d 753 (1948).
316 U.S. 255 (1942).
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The burden that the inmate must carry in showing that he
is entitled to relief because communication with the courts has
been blocked by prison officials varies with the circumstances of
each case. On the one hand are the identical Oklahoma cases of
Groom v. Hert7 and Austin v. Hert. In both cases, inmates had
been given a definite period of time to obtain a transcript and
perfect an appeal. The petitioners claimed to have delivered the
necessary application to have the transcript made at public expense to the prison post office for notarization and mailing within
the allotted time. The applications were not received by the court
until the day following the deadline for the completion of the
perfection of the appeal-one and one-half months after their
delivery to the prison post office. The applications had never been
notarized. The court found that "there is some doubt regarding
the procedure followed at the penitentiary in the mailing of petition for casemade [the Oklahoma term for transcript and exceptions] at public expense, that has never been refuted by the
State."9 Based upon this finding, the court ordered relief for the
petitioners in the form of allowing their appeal, notwithstanding
the delay. Groom and Austin would seem to indicate that once
the inmate has alleged facts which show that prison officials have
blocked his communications with the court and has established
"some doubt regarding the procedure," then the burden of proof
shifts to the officials to show that the delay and prejudice have
not been caused by their actions or regulations-either because
the inmate's mail has not been blocked or because any delay is
10
attributable to the inmate.
This interpretation is supported by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Fallen v. United States." In Fallen, the
Court essentially held that an inmate should not be prejudiced
by the failure of the court to receive a notice of appeal within the
allotted time when the inmate had delivered the notice of appeal
to the prison mail room within the requisite time. Significantly
there was no indication that the officials had delayed the mail
beyond the normal delay required in processing mail. The same
result is even more strongly indicated when the delay has been
7. 405 P.2d 125 (Okla. 1965).
8. 405 P.2d 126 (Okla. 1965).
9. 405 P.2d 125, 126 (Okla. 1965); 405 P.2d 126, 127 (Okla. 1965).
10. Bolden v. Pegelow, 218 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Va. 1963).
11. 378 U.S. 139 (1964).
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caused by active interference on the part of the prison officials. 12
As stated in Groom and Austin, "[Prison officials] should
[never] become active participants in the denial of the right to
appeal, and thus implements in denial of due process."' 3
The prison officials of course have an opportunity to refute
the allegations of delay or interference. Perhaps the most effective
means of refutation would be to demonstrate that the inmate had
previously filed numerous petitions or motions and has heretofore
had unfettered access to the courts. Numerous cases use the reasoning that since the inmate has corresponded freely with the
court hearing his petition and/or others, his claim of denial of
access to the courts is unsubstantiated." Other circumstances
supporting the prison officials' response to allegations of interference with court-directed mail have been that routine records of
the prisoner's mailings failed to disclose letters directed to courts,
and a sworn declaration of the petitioner's warden of a policy of
"free communication between inmates and the appellate
courts." 5
Reasoning that since an inmate has had access to the courts
in the past, he has not been denied in the instant case to access
to the courts, however, is a doctrine which, although still vital, is
a remnant of the old "hands off" days. The reasoning is valid
when the inmate's allegations are general and conclusionary, but
lacks validity when the allegations speak to a specific instance of
interference. 6 The interference may be the result of an isolated
response to a particular complaint, and a hearing should not be
precluded solely because obstruction has never happened before
and is against stated prison policy.
The only remedy for the obstruction of an inmate's mail so
far discussed is that the inmate shall not be prejudiced by any
delay caused by such interference. It should be noted, however,
that blocking an inmate's access to the court is also a deprivation
12. Dodge v. Bennett, 335 F.2d 657 (lst Cir. 1964).
13. 405 P.2d 125, 126 (Okla. 1965); 405 P.2d 126, 127 (Okla. 1965).
14. Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 966 (1966);
Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1963); Prewitt v. Arizona, 315 F. Supp. 793 (D.
Ariz. 1968), afl'd, 418 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1969); Hodges v. Field, 320 F. Supp. 775 (C.D.
Cal. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1970); Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304 (W.D.
Mo. 1964); People v. Wells, 261 Cal. App. 2d 468, 68 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Ct. App. 1968);
Brabson v. Wilkins, 25 App. Div. 2d 610, 267 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
15. People v. Wells, 261 Cal. App. 2d 468, 68 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Ct. App. 1968).
16. See Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963).
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of a civil right remediable under the Civil Rights Act in the form
of damages 7 [if such can be established] and/or injunctive relief
which may result in the reformulation of mailing procedures. 8
Oftentimes, however, the inmate's complaint that his access
to the courts has been obstructed is based not on direct refusals
to mail material, but rather on prison regulations which impose
such conditions on the preparation and mailing of legal papers
that the right to free access to the courts is effectively precluded.
These regulations generally take three forms: mail regulations,
regulations of inmate legal assistance, and regulations limiting
the possession of legal materials. But, the shifting attitude of the
courts away from the "hands off" doctrine has been evident, and
the unassailability of these regulations is no longer definite.
II.

A.

REGULATING THE

MAIL

Mail Directed to Courts

Despite the early lead offered by Ex parte Hull'9 that mail
regulations which obstructed a prisoner's access to the courts
should be declared invalid, the courts for the most part continued
to adhere to the "hands off' doctrine. In 1948 the Supreme Court
of Maryland, although cautioning prison officials not to prevent
freedom of communication with the courts, held that the prisoner's complaints concerning interference with his mail should be
directed to the prison authorities and not to the courts. 2 Ten
17. Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 938 (1964).
The defendant in this case was the Judge of the county court, who allegedly, in concert
with the plaintiffs warden, had prevented plaintiff from filing corum nobis petition in
Indiana's Clark County Court. The plaintiff sued the Judge (the warden having left years
ago) for damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals
reversed, holding that a claim under the Civil Rights Act had been stated. Judgment was
eventually rendered for the defendant on the basis of judicial immunity (not available to
prison officials generally) and the failure of the plaintiff to show damages. Spires v.
Bottorff, 223 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ind. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 938 (1964), reh. denied, 379 U.S. 985 (1965). Such a result should not be
comforting to prison officials.
18. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller,
312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on othergrounds sub nom., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
19. 312 U.S. 546 (1941). The regulation required that legal papers be screened by the
institutional welfare board and the legal advisor to the parole board for sufficiency prior
to mailing.
20. State ex rel. Jacobs v. Warden, 190 Md. 755, 59 A.2d 753 (1948).
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years later, a shift appeared. In People v. Howard21 and Spires v.
Dowd 2 the courts no longer directed the petitioners to the prison
officials for relief. They entertained the claims and in each case
ordered relief for the petitioners. In Howard the inmate had complained that the prison officials had refused to mail his handwritten notice of appeal and had advised him that notices of appeal
were required to be typewritten, pursuant to prison rules. Although the appellant submitted the notice for typing, it was returned with the notation that it could not be typed. He later
delivered another handwritten notice to the inmate clerk. The
court finally received a handwritten notice of appeal one day late.
The Howard court ruled that delays which were not the fault of
a prisoner could not be used to deny his statutory right of appeal.
Although the decision rested upon earlier cases, 2 3 the importance
of this case was that the Attorney General had made a concerted
attempt to have these earlier cases overturned, and argued in
essence that the prisoner should have to comply with the time
requirement imposed by law within the framework of the prison
regulations. In response the court held:
However reasonable it may be to adopt a rule that notices of
appeal must be typed [although the rules of court did not so
require] or a rule that no mail will be processed from Friday
after 4:30 P.M. until Monday, such rules cannot be used to cut
down the defendants very limited time in which to appeal. 24
The court then held the appeal to have been constructively filed
in time and considered the appeal on its merits.
In Spires v. Dowd the petitioner alleged that his warden had
issued a written order prohibiting him from writing to the judge
or clerk of the county court of Clark County, Indiana, where the
petitioner had been convicted. This order was issued after the
judge had objected to the warden, concerning a stream of letters,
inquiries and pleadings from the petitioner. The petitioner alleged further that this order prevented him from pursuing a collateral attack upon his conviction through the writ of error corum
nobis. The court held the warden was not justified in refusing to
21.
22.
23.
Tenny,
Cal. 2d
24.

166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1958).
271 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1959).
People v. Griffin, 162 Cal. App. 2d 112, 328 P.2d 502 (Ct. App. 1958); People v.
162 Cal. App. 2d 458, 328 P.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1958); and People v. Slobodian, 30
362, 181 P.2d 868 (1947).
166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d at 109.
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allow the petitioner to mail any legal document addressed to the
clerk of the proper state court.'
26 the court held that a prisoner
Also, in People v. Hairston
who alleged that his notice of appeal was refused mailing because
it lacked postage stamps had stated a claim for relief thus entitling him to a hearing on the matter. Four years later, the same
court held that a prison regulation that afforded the appellant
one free letter per week and as many as three additional stamped
letters per week, but which did not allow the appellant to mail,
in addition to his free letter, his notice of appeal because he had
no stamps, "could vitally jeopardize the rights of indigent inmates and thereby deprive them of a valuable constitutional
right." 27 Furthermore, "any state rule which would prevent remedy or redress in a proper case must be subordinated to the
United States Constitution."28
In none of these cases, however, did the court make any
general order with regard to administrative regulations. The
courts confined the relief granted to the specific appellant, noting
at the outset of their opinions that the administration of the
affairs of penal institutions are in the hands of the authorities
charged by law to carry out the proper regulatory processes, and
thus effectively disclaimed any power of the courts to promulgate
rules.
The latest expressions of the attitude preserving prison
regulations concerning the physical handling of mail while granting individual relief upon a proper showing that access to the
courts has been denied have been in Hodge v. Field29 and
Argentine v. McGinnis. 3 Both cases dismissed complaints for
failure to allege facts upon which a finding of a denial of access
to the courts could be based, and gratuitiously noted that generally prison authorities can exercise control over a prisoner's mailing privileges as a matter of internal prison affairs.
Although courts were beginning to take pains in seeing that
an individual inmate's access to the courts was not obstructed by
regulations governing the handling of the mails, they were at the
25. The court did note, however, that sending material directly to a judge was improper. Presumably then, the warden could continue to prohibit mail directed to an individual judge. 271 F.2d at 661. But see, Glenn v. Wilkerson, 309 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
26. 10 N.Y.2d 92, 176 N.E.2d 90, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1961).
27. People v. Comacho, 46 Misc. 2d 705, 260 N.Y.S.2d 723, 730 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
28. Id.
29. 320 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1970).
30. 311 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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same time unsympathetic to requests of inmates to obtain special
or affirmative treatment of certain mailings. Initially in Hil v.
United States3 the proposition was that prison officials were
under no affirmative duty to effectuate the filing of appeals. Hill
had argued that he was under apprehension of reprisal if he filed
an appeal and that the prison officials had effectively blocked his
access to the courts by failing in their duty to remove this apprehension by aiding his preparation of an appeal. The court noted
that since this apprehension was never communicated to the
prison officials, they could not be charged with exerting pressure
on the prisoner, nor did they have the burden of easing his fears.
In support of this general position, in Schack v. Wainwright3 2 the
court of appeals affirmed the denial of relief by a district court
in which the appellant asked for an injunction to obtain the right
to have his mail relating to legal proceedings sent "postage prepaid by certified mail-return receipt requested." It was undisputed that the prison officials would post court-directed correspondence in the normal way, and gave assurances thereof to the
appellant. The court of appeals gave no opinion of its own, but
merely quoted from the ruling of the district court that the control of mails was a necessary adjunct to penal incarceration, and
"only if rules and regulations prohibit and unduly hinder a prisoner's efforts to secure relief from illegal detention or treatment
would a federal court be justified in looking into aspects of prison
administration relating to the use of the mails." 33 It was found
that the petitioner was not prohibited or unduly hindered. Thus
the attitude expressed in Schack was that prison regulation of the
mail was the norm, and a petitioner must show that these rules
have prejudiced him. The authorities were under no dutynotwithstanding the burden of the petitioner's right to have
free access to the courts-to explain the necessity or reasonability of such rules. Instead, if anything, they had only to respond to the petitioner's allegations with a showing that the petitioner had not been prohibited or unduly hindered by the rules.
Thus, the prison officials were also relieved of taking any affirmative steps to facilitate a petitioner's access to the courts without
having to show that such steps would inconvenience their operations. This position is contrary to the affirmative duty recognized
31. 268 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1959).
32. 391 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1007 (1968).
33. Id. at 608.
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by most judges to assist indigent inmates in getting their claims
for relief properly before the court."
Although this "as-little-laying-on of hands-as-necessary"
doctrine that began in the late fifties continued to enjoy favor
with some courts, a new approach was signaled in Coleman v.
Peyton.5 In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Coleman
sought, among other things, relief from interference with his mail
by the prison officials. The court denied relief generally under the
authority of McCloskey v. Maryland,36 and also found that there
had been no substantial or intentional hindrance of the prisoner's
access to the courts within the rules previously in force. Therefore, upon the statement of the authorities that disavowed any
such purpose, no relief was ordered. However, the court did not
stop at that point, although under the bulk of then current authority it could have ceased. Instead, the court launched into a
far-reaching dictum regarding the general handling of inmates'
mail to and from the courts:
The right [of access to the courts] and its exercise are adequately secured in the future, we think only if delivery to a
prisoner of incoming matter from a court having jurisdiction to
hear his complaints and the mailing of his communications to
such a court are delayed no longer than the necessities of sorting
require. Further delay for other purposes, such as censorship,
seems both inappropriate and unnecessary. If a Virginia prisoner should attempt to use a Virginia court or one of the United
States as a letter drop for the conduct of an unauthorized or
objectionable correspondence, the court can be expected to report the matter promptly and to refuse to suffer such a perversion of its offices. Censoring takes time, and a letter at the
bottom of a pile does not receive the immediate or sometimes
the prompt attention of the censor. Precensorship sorting followed by the immediate dispatch of communications addressed
to the courts is both becoming and essential to the avoidance of
37
unnecessary delay.
At about the same time, the New York judiciary was pondering
34. See, e.g., Boykin v. Huff, 121 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
35. 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966).
36. 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964) (enunciating the power of prison officials to regulate
the mail of inmates).
37. Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1966).
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the case of Brabson v. Wilkins, 3 in which the petitioner sought
relief from censorship. In BrabsonI, the Supreme Court Special
Term [the trial court] entered the following order with respect
to censorship of mail addressed to courts: "Ordered that the respondent be directed and instructed to cease and desist from intercepting, obstructing, or otherwise delaying any communications
addressed to any court." From the court's opinion it is clear that
the order was intended to preclude censorship of such mail. Both
parties appealed the decision, and in Brabson II the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court modified the order to the effect
that it appeared to grant prison authorities the power to censor
mail addressed to a court. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order in Brabson II, but undercut the interpretation
of the order which would allow censorship of court-directed mail.
In speaking of the differences between the orders of the lower
courts, the court of appeals noted that the Brabson11 order left
the BrabsonI order "unchanged as to 'any court'." Commenting
on the reasonableness of the BrabsonII order the court stated,
"The prisoner may write to a court about anything . . . ." Although three of the seven judges dissented, their dissenting position was that the BrabsonI order should be reinstated, but they
evidenced no concern regarding censorship of mail to the courts.
Given the tenor of their opinion, such lack of concern indicates
that they were clearly in agreement with the majority in the "no
censorship" approach in the area of court-directed mail.
This "no censorship of court-directed mail" approach lay
dormant for the next few years, but in Sostre v. Rockefeller,"
Carothers v. Follette,"° and Palmigiano v. Travisano1 it was restated and applied. In Sostre the court adopted the minority
opinion in Brabson III as the law constitutionally required in the
area of legal communications. In Carothersthe court relied heavily upon Sostre v. Rockefeller in ordering the prison officials not
to read any correspondence addressed by the inmate to any court
[although Sostre v. McGinnis" later only enjoined prison officials
38. 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (hereinafter cited as Brabson I), modified, 267
N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div. 1966) (hereinafter cited as BrabsonfI), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 227
N.E.2d 383, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Brabson III).
39. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on othergrounds sub nom., 442 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1971).
40. 314 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
41. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
42. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
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from deleting material from such letters]. In Palmigiano the
court issued a temporary injunction pending hearing by a threejudge federal district court prohibiting the prison officials from
opening or otherwise inspecting mail to or from any judges or
clerks of court.
In these cases, the courts were presented with established law
affirming the power of prison officials to regulate and censor
prison mail. Why, then, were they so easily persuaded that this
authority was obsolete? One can glean from a reading of the opinions the fact that the prison officials were unable to convince the
judges of the necessity of a rule which inhibited the right of access
to the courts:
The record before this court, though pregnant, with utterances
of fear in the testimony of the prison officials offers nothing in
this regard by way of credible evidence.43
From Judge Keating's dissent in BrabsonIII comes this prophetic
language:
Exactly how the exercise of this right will undermine prison
discipline is not made clear . . . . No valid reason, other than
the shibboleth of prison discipline, has been advanced for the
denial of this right in the case before us. I believe that courts
should look behind inappropriate slogans so often offered up as
excuses for ignoring or abridging the constitutional rights of our
citizens.44
Thus it would appear that the rules governing communications to the courts must rest upon the necessity of the rule to
dispel a reasonable apprehension of disruption based upon fact
and not upon opinion and theory.4" In short, prison officials must
be prepared to justify on the grounds of need a mail regulation
which restricts a prisoner's right to communicate with the courts.
What then might such needs be? The test is likely to be whether
or not the interest served by the regulation is a compelling one,
permitting the circumspection of a fundamental right. Thus
many arguments which have served well before will not be available. For example in Spires v. Dowd" the court held that while
blocking mail to a court was impermissible, sending mail to an
43.
44.
45.
46.

Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 785 (D.R.I. 1970).
19 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 565, 227 N.E.2d at 386.
Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
271 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1959).
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individual judge was improper and could be restrained on the
grounds that the mail to the judge was of an offensively repetitive
nature. Similarly, in Barber v. Page47 the court held that a prisoner was not entitled to send a letter to an individual Justice of
the United States Supreme Court. The obvious purpose of such
restrictions is to insulate judges from annoying, repetitive, and
oftentimes offensive mail where no legal relief is available or even
requested. But is providing such insulation to judges a valid state
interest? If so, is this interest a compelling one which allows the
restriction on the fundamental right of an inmate's access to the
court? And even if it is a compelling reason, is the restriction the
least restrictive means necessary to accomplish the purpose for
which it is intended?
The more recent cases indicate that the insulation of judges
from inconvenient mail serves no valid state function, let alone a
compelling state interest." In any event, it seems that even if a
compelling state interest could be found, a blanket proscription
on mail to individual judges, as in Spires and Barber, would be
more than the minimum necessary to insulate judgs from offensive mail, and would affect large numbers of inmates who are
sending mail to judges seeking relief. Such a regulation would
fail, since less restrictive alternatives would be available (e.g.,
reaction against an individual inmate based upon a complaint)
to serve the interest, if it exists.
Thus the trend seems to be that mail between inmate and
court or judge must not be intercepted or censored. Inspection of
court mail has not been an issue as yet, but recall the language
of Coleman v. Peyton:
Precensorship sorting followed by the immediate dispatch of
communications addressed to the courts is both becoming and
essential to the avoidance of delay.
This statement would seem to leave little room for the assertion
of a power to inspect, although it is not explicit. If asserted, the
power to inspect mail from courts will have to be strongly bol47. 239 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Okla. 1965), rev'd, 355 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1966).
48. Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966);
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.
Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);

Glenn v. Wilkerson, 309 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Mo. 197); Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433,
227 N.E.2d 383, 230 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1967).

49. 362 F.2d at 907.
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stered by a factual foundation concerning the breaches of security
or discipline that probably will result if inspections are not allowed. It would almost be necessary to impute to a large portion
of the judiciary the role of co-conspirators, accomplices or smugglers of contraband, or to demonstrate a common neglect on the
part of the judiciary in withholding judicial stationary from such
individuals. On the other hand, however, Sostre v. McGinnis did
hold that "prison officials may open and read all [including that
with courts] incoming and outgoing correspondence to and from
prisoners."50
B.

Mail Directed to Public Officials

Courts, however, are not the only agencies to which an inmate might wish to correspond in search of relief from his conviction or the conditions of confinement. Notably, public officials in
the executive or legislative branches of government and legal defense and civil rights organizations might be the targets of pleas
for assistance by an inmate. Such correspondence has been the
subject of litigation in the past and the law is presently in a state
of swift change and development.
The right to correspond with public officials was first asserted in McClosky v. Maryland" and Lee v. Tahash.12 In both
cases, bizarre features obscured the constitutional issues and no
resolution beyond the application of the "hands off" doctrine was
had. However, the Brabson v. Wilkins53 series of cases provided a
reasoned consideration of the issue. In Brabson I the trial court
lumped mail to public officials together with mail to courts and
attorneys, and restrained prison officials from interfering with
any of it. The intermediate appellate division modified the order
in Brabson II with respect to mail to public officials as follows:
That [prison officials are] hereby directed to cease and desist
from intercepting and withholding . . .any communications
addressed to any executive official of the Federal or State Government concerning his complaints about unlawful treatment
by prison authorities . . . subject to the right of the prison au50. 442 F.2d at 201.
51. 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964).
52. 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965).
53. 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified, 267 N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div. 1966),
aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 227 N.E.2d 383, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1967).
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thorities to censor such communications and strike therefrom
any material not relating to the foregoing. 4

11

As so modified, this order was approved by the New York Court
of Appeals in Brabson III, and as such it established the limited
right of prisoners to correspond with public officials for limited
purposes, with the reservation of power to the prison officials to
monitor the mail to see that the correspondence stayed within the
proper zone. However, these limitations were the subject of strong
dissent; Judge Keating argued that he could perceive of no distinction between mail to the courts (which could not be interfered
with at all) and mail to public officials that would justify or
support the restrictions on the latter correspondence.
The concept of a common quality between letters addressed
to and from courts and public officials has become the foundation
of the new wave of cases which have treated this issue. 5 Both
types of letters serve a common purpose-i.e. to secure a lawful
remedy for an alleged grievance. Whether the power to grant
relief flows from judicial or administrative sources should make
no difference in the inmate's right to apply for such relief in an
unrestrained fashion.
Under the formula or parity between mail to courts and public officials, the withholding of a letter to a public officer requesting specific information concerning an inmate's case (as opposed
to specific relief) would also be immune from interference.- The
purpose of the letter relating to the terms of confinement would
qualify it for special treatment. It could not be restrained, although it could be read to see that it was not an attempt to abuse
the right. However, a new advance may have been signaled by
Conklin v. Hancock,57 in which the court prohibited the censorship of letters addressed to public officials, although they could
be read for purposes of discovering whether or not such letters
were being improperly used in an attempt to conspire to escape.
On the other hand, the court ruled that letters from public officials could not even be opened by prison officials.
In the future, however, the courts are likely to rule in favor
of unrestrained correspondence between inmates and courts and
54.
55.
178 (2d
56.
57.

267 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
Levier v. Woodson, 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
Cir. 1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
Cf. Pope v. Daggett, 350 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1965).
334 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971).
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public officials. It would be difficult to imagine courts or public
officials conspiring with an inmate to undertake some breach of
prison discipline or smuggle contraband. Thus the danger to
these state interests from unrestricted correspondence rights
(unopened letters) with public officials is hard to conceive. Justifying the intrusion of censorship or even reading of this mail will
be almost impossible as a general rule. The intrusion is a grave
one, as previously discussed, and in balancing these considerations, the courts will likely take a position along the lines of the
dictum of Coleman v. Peyton that no restraints at all will be
allowed on inmate mail to and from courts and public officials,
in the absence of a showing of abuse by individual inmates. Even
then, any justifiable restraints will have to be imposed only upon
the offenders, and not on the prison population generally.
C.

Mail Directed to Attorneys

Oftentimes, however, inmates do not communicate directly
with courts or other officials, but rather utilize or seek to utilize
counsel in presenting their argument. When attempts to communicate with counsel through the mails are hindered and obstructed, inmates are likely to complain, and depending on the
nature and extent of the interference, the courts have been willing
to listen. In an early case, Green v. Maine," the court was concerned over an allegation that the defendant had been held incommunicado during the pre-trial stage. Although the inmate
failed to sustain this allegation, the court hinted that such an
action would be a violation of the defendant's right to counsel.
The right to counsel, however, only provides a foundation for
communications to an attorney of record during, or in preparation
for, litigation. Unless the inmate is involved in a critical stage of
a criminal proceeding, the right to counsel does not alone provide
a basis for a right to communicate generally with attorneys. The
right to counsel, however, is not the only source of a prisoner's
right to communicate generally with lawyers. Instead, this right
has been held to be part of the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process right of access to the courts. In Bailleaux v. Holmes59 the
court succinctly stated:
58. 113 F. Supp. 253 (D. Me. 1953).
59. 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959); rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hatfield v.
Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
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However, the right to inspect [mail] should not be used to
delay communications to attorneys . . . since such delay could
amount to an effective denial of a prisoner's right to access to
the courts."

This statement has been the rule ever since.'
Once the right to communicate generally with attorneys has
been identified as derivative of the right of access to the court;
much of what has been said concerning the propriety of limita-

tions on the right of access to the courts is applicable to the right
to communicate with attorneys. There have been some distinctions drawn, however, which usually concern the scope of the
prison's authority to censor and inspect mail directed to or from

attorneys.
1. Interception and Censorship
The early approach of the courts was to approve virtually any
interference and censorship of an inmate's mail:
The censoring of mail is a prison rule. The court will not interfere with such rules which are so necessary in the orderly conduct of an institution. [It cannot] be considered a denial of due
process. 2

More recently, there has been some weakening of the "hands off"
approach. This was first signaled by Bailleaux v. Holmes,63 discussed previously, and reinforced by In re Ferguson,4 which after
citing Bailleaux v. Holmes went on to hold:
[It is] an abuse of discretion for prison regulations to be
utilized so as to deny an inmate the opportunity to procure with
reasonable promptness or to communicate within a reasonably
60. Id. at 364 [Emphasis added].
61. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 952 (1965); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Carothers v.
Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1971); In re Allison, 66 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1961); and
Brabson v. Wilkins, 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified on other grounds, 267
N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div. 1966), afl'd, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 227 N.E.2d 383, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561
(1967).
62. United States ex rel. Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553, 559-60 (E.D. Ill.
1958), aft'd, 261 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1958). See also Green v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253 (D.
Me. 1953).
63. 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
64. 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1961).
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prompt manner, a member of the Bar on matters pertaining to
alleged violations of the prisoners' rights . . .65
The position of the courts had shifted from that of "hands off'
to that of a limited interference to determine if the regulations
actually operated to obstruct an inmate's attempts to communicate with the attorney of record or with members of the legal
profession to assist in presenting his claims.
This view was reaffirmed in McClosky v. Maryland:"
Of course, prison officials should not interfere with (the inmate's) access to the courts, or with a reasonable correspondence designed to secure for himself legal assistance for the purpose of testing the validity of his conviction or the constitutionality of punitive treatment which he may claim to be cruel and
unreasonable. . . .We only hold that he has no constitutional
right to seek legal assistance in aid of propagandizing endeavors.

67

5
Compare the language of In re Ferguson:"

[Ilt is manifest that the right of a prisoner to petition a court
for redress of alleged illegal restraints on his liberty is unreasonably eroded if the prison authorities may be allowed to deny a
prisoner the opportunity of procuring counsel, so that his petition for writ of habeas corpus or other mode of redress always
must be presented in propria persona. It must also be conceded
that when a prisoner is writing to an attorney in an attempt to
secure legal representation, he must be allowed to set forth factual matters even though derogatory or critical of the prison
authorities, since he must persuade the attorney receiving the
letter that the writer's rights as a prisoner truly have been violated, so as to interest that attorney in the prisoner's alleged
case against the prison authorities."
While this language might seem to indicate that the prison officials were to be restrained from censoring the content of prisoner
mail to attorneys, such was not the ruling. The case only prohibited the censoring of material which was critical of prison offi65. Id. at 761, 361 P.2d at 425.
66. 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964).
67. Id. at 74-75. The petition was denied on the grounds that the inmate was mainly
seeking to propagandize his anti-Semitism and his claim of seeking legal assistance was
unfounded.
68. 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1961).
69. Id. at 761, 361 P.2d at 425.
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cials. A similar ruling was the final result of the Brabson v.
Wilkins 0 series discussed previously. Brabson I ordered prison
officials not to censor mail to attorneys.,This order was modified
in Brabson II and affirmed in BrabsonIII to prohibit interception
of:
. . .any communications addressed to his attorney concerning
the legality of his detention and treatment received while incarcerated, . . .subject to the right of the prison authorities to
censor such communications and strike therefrom any material
not relating to the foregoing."
Under this rule, as in Ferguson,material critical of prison officials
could not be censored, because inmates' criticisms could well
form the basis for a challenge to the "legality of his confinement
[in isolation for example] and treatment received while incarcerated."
On the other hand, material which was not related to or
2
seeking legal relief could still be censored. Thus in In re Gregg
the court held that the censorship of a letter to an attorney which
contained "grisley halftruths and fabrications" was proper. This
case, however, was decided under the "hands off" rule, and the
prison official's statement that the letter contained these objectionable passages was accepted without proof. Under the
Ferguson-Brabsonrule, the burden on the officials would be
greater to show that the censored material was unrelated to legal
relief.
A clearer indication of what may or may not be censored
under the Ferguson-Brabsonrules comes from Rhinehart v.
Rhay. 3 The inmate had attempted to send letters to his attorney
which the court found to contain references to anticipated habeas
corpus proceedings, reported cases dealing with sodomy, reports
of the inmates' observations of "'boundless' acts of 'oral sodomy,'" and expressions of his opinions that sodomy and other
comparable acts should be made legal between consenting adults.
The court found that "taken as a whole . . . the letters could
reasonably be suspected to reveal a pathological fixation with the
subject of sodomy," and held that the withholding of these letters
70. 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified, 267 N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div. 1966),
aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 227 N.E.2d 383, 280 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1967).
71. 267 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
72. 143 Mont. 533, 392 P.2d 87 (1964).
73. 314 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
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from the mails did not infringe the inmate's rights to correspond
with counsel. Another element of this case which was important
to the court was the expressed desire of the inmate for the attorney to save his letters for future "nationwide'" publication. It
should be noted that in Rhinehart, unlike Gregg, the prison authorities submitted the letters to the court.
While the Ferguson-Brabsonrule is probably the most reliable statement of the generally applicable rule on the subject as
indicated not only by court rulings but by institutional responses
thereto,'4 the rule sets the stage for the question of who decides
whether the material is related to legal relief and thus entitled to
unrestricted transmission. If the inmate in Rhinehart was describing acts of sodomy performed upon him against his will in
the hope that an action could be brought to secure some relief
from such abuse, or charging officials with negligence or complicity in the practice, it would seem that such a letter could not be
censored under Ferguson-Brabson.However, such a letter might
be erroneously or maliciously restrained under the authority of
Rhinehart.The opportunity for abuse of the discretion to censor
attorney mail under Ferguson-Brabsonis clear. The danger was
articulated by Judge Keating in his dissent in Brabson III:
I believe that these limitations (on the inmate's communications with counsel) as well as the authority given the warden
unnecessarily interfere with and endanger this prisoner's right
to communicate with his attorney. . . .The appellate division
• . .overlooked the fact that judges and courts are not the only
persons or agencies capable of granting relief to prisoners complaining about the illegality of their treatment or detention. For
this reason I see no basis for distinguishing between letters to
courts [and] the prisoner's attorney . . . .In . . .these cases
only the recipients of the letters should be permitted to determine whether the contents warrant their intervention and not
the very person whose jurisdiction and conduct are being questioned.75
In answer to the prison officials' argument that unrestricted
communication would allow inmates to carry on unauthorized
activities through their attorneys, the court noted that such com74. See, e.g., United States v. Stahl, 393 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 879 (1968); Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 963 (1970); Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
75. 19 N.Y.2d at 438, 227 N.E.2d at 385, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
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munication was available through attorney visitation without any
apparent undermining of prison discipline, and furthermore that:
. . . [T]he right of a prisoner to unexpurgated communications
with his attorney is so significant that it outweights the danger
of frustration of prison rules regarding outside activities in the
rare case where an attorney-an officer of the court-would assist a prisoner in avoiding legitimate prison regulations ....
No valid reason, other than the shibboleth of prison discipline,
has been advanced for the denial of this right in the case before
us. I believe that courts should look before ignoring or abridging
the constitutional rights of our citizens."
Although Judge Keating represented the minority view in
Brabson III, recently other courts have utilized his approach in
ordering new restraints on prison officials. In the first of these
cases, correctional authorities were apparently caught unaware
and were able to offer no persuasive reason for restraining inmate
mail to attorneys. Thus in Sostre v. Rockefeller7 7 and Carothers
v. Follette78 the courts ruled that prison officials could not censor
prisoner mail to or from attorneys since it served no valid state
interest and severely affected the inmates' right to access to the
court through counsel. In Palmigiano v. Travisano, the court
went so far as to enjoin temporarily even the opening, reading,
and inspection of mail from attorneys, since the correctional authorities were unable to carry the factual burden of establishing
the danger to the security and discipline that might result from
such free transmittal.
In short, the trend is to treat inmate correspondence with
attorneys in the same manner as correspondence with courts and
to enjoin censorship by prison officials of inmate-attorney mail.
Sostre v. McGinnis reversed Sostre v. Rockefeller on this point
and explicitly held that prison authorities were to be forbidden
from deleting material from, withholding, or refusing to mail a
communication between an inmate and his attorney unless they
could demonstrate that the inmate had clearly abused his right
of access. Such abuses would include the transmittal of contraband, laying plans for some unlawful scheme, or attempting to
use the right to correspond with an attorney as a pretext for
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 439-40, 227 N.E.2d at 386, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 565-66.
312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
314 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
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corresponding about some "restricted matter"-although no indication of what a "restricted matter" might be was given. In so
holding, Sostre v. McGinnis explicitly sanctioned the opening
and reading of inmate mail to and from attorneys. This approach
has been followed in Tyree v. Fitzpatrick" and Collena v.
Schoonfield.8'
Sostre v. McGinnis is not a return to the Brabson-Ferguson
approach, however, since under Sostre the prison officials may
not delete anything (in their opinion) unrelated to the inmate's
legal business, as they could under Brabson-Ferguson;they can
delete only material concerning "restricted matters" if the inmate abuses the right of access by attempting to circumvent the
ordinary correspondence rules. The decision of what is relevant
to the inmate's legal business has thus been removed from the
hands of the prison officials and placed in the hands of the attorney, where it properly belongs.
An indication of the limitations placed by Sostre v.
McGinnis on prison officials may be found in Godwin v. Oswald.82
In Godwin, the court enjoined the withholding by prison officials
of mail directed to inmate members of a putative Prison Labor
Union, from the attorney representing the putative union. The
authorities had interpreted the letter as a call for illegal action
and felt that the very existence of a Prison Labor Union posed a
threat to the security of the institution. The court ruled contrarily
observing that while the letter was perhaps a little optimistic
concerning the possible success of the venture, it was sufficiently
cautionary in tone to be more in the nature of legal advice than
an incitement to breach security. Particularly persuasive to the
court was the advice to the "membership" of the union to abide
by all institution rules and regulations pending the recognition of
the union by the state. The letter, having thus been characterized
as legal advice, could not be withheld from the inmates under the
Sostre rationale since no abuse of the right of access could be
demonstrated. Consequently the court held that the authorities
had erroneously withheld the letter from the inmates.
On the other hand, not all courts are accepting the "go slow"
approach of Sostre v. McGinnis. In Moore v. Ciccone83 the court
80.
81.
82.
83.

325 F. Supp. 554 (D. Mass. 1971).
344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972).
462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972).
459 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1972).
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held that prison regulations governing censorship and inspection
of inmate-attorney mail raised questions of constitutional magnitude which required an evidentiary hearing to be held as to
whether the regulations were an unconstitutional restraint on the
prisoner's right of access to the courts. More importantly, four of
the eight members of the court would have gone further and
prohibited the opening of mail between attorney and inmate
client. In McDonnell v. Wolff,84 the court did just that. These
cases seem to indicate that there is no justification for the prison
authorities to censor mail between inmates and their attorneys.
If, despite the Sostre line of cases, no justification exists for censoring inmate-attorney mail, then the focus must shift to whether
authorities may inspect such correspondence and if so, how. A
number of cases have already proceeded to this analytical stage.
2.

Inspection

The burden to justify inspection for contraband may be easier, since the necessary inspection can be accomplished with a
minimal infringement on the right to correspond with attorneys.
Thus in Marsh v. Moore85 the court enjoined censorship and opening of inmate-attorney mail since inspection for contraband could
be accomplished with a fluoroscope, metal detecting device, or by
manual manipulation. Similarly in Peoples v. Wainwright86
prison officials were restrained from opening or reading inmateattorney mail, but were allowed to subject such mail to outward
inspection for contraband." The courts also restrained the inmates and their attorneys from sending non-legal communications and restrained the attorneys from acting as conduits for
non-litigational material which they might receive.
In Smith v. Rob bins88 correctional authorities, having agreed
not to read mail between an inmate and his attorney, asked to
retain the unrestricted power to open attorney mail to inspect it
for contraband. The court ruled that such an opening would infringe the inmate's right, guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment, to communicate privately with counsel. The court found
84. 342 F. Supp. 616 (D. Neb. 1972).
85. 325 F. Supp. 392 (D. Mass. 1971). See also McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616
(D. Neb. 1971).
86. 325 F. Supp. 402 (D. Fla. 1971).
87. See also Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
88. 328 F. Supp. 1962 (D. Me. 1971), aff'd 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss4/10

22

Wedlock: The Emerging Rights of the Confined: Access to the Courts and Cou
19731

ACCESS TO THE COURTS AND COUNSEL

that the unrestricted power to open mail could be abused, in that
the mail could then easily be read without the knowledge of the
inmate; and that the potential for such abuse would unconstitutionally restrain an inmate from being candid with his attorney
and vice versa. The remedy, the court ruled, was for the prison
officials to open and inspect the mail only in the presence of the
inmate, thus demonstrating to him that his correspondence with
his attorney would not be read. 9
A somewhat less restrictive position on the issue of opening
for inspection was taken by the court in Rhem v. McGrath." The
prison officials had already been restrained from reading inmateattorney mail but wished to open incoming mail to inspect for
contraband. The court recognized the potential for abuse and the
primacy of the privacy of the attorney-client relationship guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court ruled
that mail from attorneys in cases in which the prison officials
were named parties could not be opened for inspection, but modified this holding by further ruling that this injunction was not to
restrain such inspection where other means of assuring confidential consultations between inmates and attorneys were available.
Specifically mentioned as an alternative means of assuring privacy were private face-to-face meetings between inmates and
their attorneys.
Sostre v. McGinnis and its approach to censorship is subject
to the criticism leveled at the Brabson-Fergusonrule by Judge
Keating in his dissent in Brabson III. Unless the prison authorities can establish individual abuses by inmates and attorneys, a
blanket rule permitting the opening and reading of inmateattorney mail is constitutionally suspect. The danger of the subversion of prison discipline is slight. Because prison security visa-vis contraband can be protected by less intrusive means, as
indicated by Marsh, Peoples, Rhem and Smith, which weigh
against the state interest, the right of communication with counsel would be greatly intruded upon by reading inmate-attorney
mail. Additionally, such a power may be greatly abused as demonstrated in Cox v. Crouse91 and McClelland v. State.12 In both
Cox and McClelland the warden, after reading letters between an
89.
90.
91.
92.

See also Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion).
326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
376 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1967).
4 Md. App. 18, 240 A.2d 769 (1968).
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inmate and his attorney, forwarded the contents thereof to the
representative of the state opposing the inmate during pending
litigation. In both cases, the courts disapproved the practice, but
no relief was granted to the inmates for this infringement of their
rights, since they were unable to establish that their cases had
been prejudiced thereby. The trend of the cases, notwithstanding
Sostre v. McGinnis, is likely to continue in the direction of enjoining the opening for any purpose of an inmate's mail to and from
attorneys. The attempted balance struck by the court in Rhem
v. McGrath is not likely to alter this trend, since it is not likely
to provide a workable solution from an attorney's perspective.
The time-consuming nature of visitation vis-a-vis a confidential
note or letter is more likely to result in further attacks on the
system rather than a reduction of them. And even should the
system prove workable in New York City, distance and transportation problems in other parts of the country are likely to result
in a Rhem-type system creating an unconstitutional burden on
the right of private consultation.
The courts may be willing to go as far with inmate-attorney
mail as they have with court-directed mail, however, prison officials should have an easier burden justifying some restrictions on
mail to and from attorneys. But even these regulations are likely
to be much more narrow than those which are currently approved. For example, the reading of an inmate's mail to and from
his attorney is a grave intrusion of the attorney-client relationship, especially pending or during litigation with the state. The
dangers to be avoided from a prison administrative viewpoint are
smuggling of contraband and communications concerning "restricted matters". The first of these dangers could be largely
avoided by the procedure adopted in Marsh v. Moore and Peoples
v. Wainwright, i.e., external manual, fluoroscopic, or chemical
analysis of letters. In addition, in case of ongoing litigation, the
attorney may be restrained from acting as a conduit of improper
information. Where a court does not have jurisdiction of the parties, or when an inmate is seeking legal assistance, prison officials
might be able to assert more control over the flow of mail (e.g.,
opening of incoming mail), although a showing of specific abuse
by an inmate or a particular attorney might be necessary to support such control.
With respect to all these classes of correspondentsattorneys, court officials and public officials-the objection is
often raised by prison officials that official stationery might be
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stolen and used by inmates to circumvent the normal correspondence restrictions. The court in Peoples v. Wainwright"
ruled that such a danger could be obviated by the corresponding attorney inserting a sealed letter to the inmate in an
envelope with a cover letter to the prison officials, identifying
the prisoner for whom the enclosure was intended, and signed by
the attorney. This procedure could be adopted as well by courts
and public officials. A cover letter need not always be necessary
if the outside of the sealed letter to the inmate were signed by his
correspondent, whose signature could be compared if necessary to
one on a signature card. Initial incoming correspondence would
be verified by phone if the individual were not familiar with this
procedure, and initial outgoing correspondence could be accompanied by instructions on compliance.
Since most of the aforementioned cases have dealt with mail
between an attorney and his client, the question might arise as
to whether the powers of correctional officials would be any different with respect to mail to or from attorneys who do not officially
represent the inmate in question. Perhaps there would be more
justification for the power to open and reach such correspondence, as the addressee is not yet an established feature of the
inmate's associations, and thus more caution may be in order.
9 4 suggested
However, Palmigiano v. Travisano
that there is no
difference by ruling that no correspondence between the inmate
and his attorney or any other attorney duly licensed to practice
law may be opened or inspected.
Another distinguishing factor may be the classification of the
inmate. A severe classification may serve to justify certain restrictions of rights of inmates that could not be justified for the general prison population. 5 On the other hand, the more severe the
classification of a prisoner, the more important his right of access
to the court may become, thus making unrestricted flow of correspondence with counsel all the more important."
D.

Mail Directed to Service Organizations
An inmate sometimes seeks to correspond with individuals

93. 325 F. Supp. 402 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
94. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
95. See Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961); Accord, McKinney v.
DeBord, 324 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
96. See, Coleman v. Peyton, 302 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966).
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and groups in attempts to interest them in his plight and secure
their assistance in instituting court proceedings. Such letters are
often treated as ordinary correspondence by prison officials. The
early cases supported such treatment." However, a weakening
of this support appeared in McCloskey v. Marylandin which the
court stated:
An effort to correspond in reasonable terms with a limited number of national organizations. . . in aid of [securing legal assistance] . . . would produce a different question."
9 and Burns v.
In two recent cases, Nolan v. Scafatil
Swenson,' 0 the result alluded to in McCloskey was declared. In
Nolan, the court of appeals unambiguously held that it was tantamount to a denial of access to the courts for prison officials to
refuse to mail a letter to the Massachusetts affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union:

Johnson v. Avery["'] clearly stands for the general proposition
that an inmate's right of access to the courts involves a corollary
right to obtain some assistance in preparing his communication
with the court. Given that corollary we fail to see how a state,
at least in the absence of some countervailing state interest not
here appearing [the letter was rejected because it contained
"lies"], can prevent an inmate from seeking legal assistance
from bona fide organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union.'"2
In Burns the district court held that refusing "a prisoner the
right to correspond with a responsible organization which might
afford him legal assistance is so closely associated with a denial
of access to the court that the blanket restrictions on such correspondence must be held unlawful. 1 11 3 On appeal, the prison authorities attempted to have this order stricken, but the court was
not persuaded entirely. The court did modify, however, the broad
decision of the district court by adding that correspondence with
the ACLU may be subjected to "reasonable regulation consistent
97. Ortega v. Ragan, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954); Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304
(W.D. Mo. 1964).

98. 337 F.2d at 74-75.
99. 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970).
100. 300 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Mo. 1969), modified, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
101. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
102. 430 F.2d at 551.
103. 300 F. Supp. at 762.
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with legitimate policies of internal prison administration and security, so long as such regulations do not deny Burns access to
the ACLU, and through it to the courts." ' The court also noted
0 5 a judge of the district
that in an unreported opinion"
court had
held that the allegation of an inmate that he had been hampered
in his request for aid from the ACLU did not, without more, state
any claim of violation of a federally protected right.
The court of appeals in Burns gave no indication of what a
"reasonable regulation" might be, nor what constituted a legitimate policy of internal prison administration and security. Thus
upon reflection, the Nolan-Burns approach to the regulation of
mail to and from groups in a position to give legal assistance to
inmates is the approximate equivalent of the Ferguson-Brabson
rule with respect to mail to attorneys: i.e., correspondence may
not be shut off, but it may be subjected to regulation such as
inspection and limited censoring.
Correspondence in search of "legal assistance" may encompass more than that addressed only to securing an attorney's
services. In McDonough v. Directorof Patuxant"6 the inmate of
a facility for defective delinquents in Maryland sought to correspond with a psychiatrist and Playboy magazine to authorize its
publication of certain letters designed to generate financial assistance to mount a broad challenge to the constitutionality of the
defective delinquent law, the treatment and facilities at the institution, and the legality of his confinement. The director of the
institution refused to mail the letter and also prohibited the giving of a power of attorney to the inmate's local attorney. The
inmate challenged this action as denial of access to the courts,
alleging that the prohibited mailings were necessary to secure an
adequate hearing on the issues he wished to litigate. The court
held that insofar as the inmate's correspondence was intended to
obtain expert testimony and legal and financial assistance for his
litigation, he could not be restrained. Insofar as the purpose of the
correspondence was to publish a critique of the defective delinquency law and its implementation at Patuxant with a deleterious effect upon institutional control and discipline, treatment
programs and other inmates, the prison administrators would not
104. 430 F.2d at 777.
105. Hand v. Wilkinson, Cir. No. 1568 (S.D. Mo. March 25, 1970, cited at, 430 F.2d
at 777, n.5.
106. 429 F.2d 1189 (4th Cir. 1970).
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be powerless in their discretion to suppress the letters-a result
in accord with the Nolan-Burns approach. Consequently, the
emerging rule appears to be that of recognizing a right on the part
of an inmate to correspond with virtually anyone he considers
might assist him with his alleged plight. Additional restrictions
would require a conclusive, positive, factual showing of abuse or
substantial danger to the penal interests of discipline or security
that would flow from the relaxation of the restrictions or the use
of a less restrictive alternative regulation.
III.

REGULATING INMATE ASSISTANCE

Writ-writers and other forms of inmate assistance have long
existed in the prison society. Regulations restricting these activities by inmates are also common experience. Until about four
years ago, however, these regulations were untested in the courts.
About 1967, a rush of cases challenging restrictions on inmate
assistance were decided. The initial response of the courts was
mixed, but the bulk of them upheld prison regulations against
claims that they effectively denied inmates access to the courts. 01
Notable exceptions to this trend were Johnson v. Avery,"'" Arey
v. Peyton,"' and Coonts v. Wainwright.""°
In 1969, however, the United States Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Avery,"' settled the issue of the constitutionality of
blanket prohibitions on inmate assistance. The Court stressed
that such prohibitions placed an unequal burden on indigent and
illiterate prisoners in asserting their rights. This "equal protection" approach to the right of inmate assistance would apply no
matter what relief the inmate sought, or for that matter, where
he sought it. The Supreme Court stated, however, that inmate
assistance could be barred by correctional authorities if meaningful alternatives were available to the inmate and if the restraints
placed upon inmate assistance were reasonable-such as limitations on the time and place for assistance and penalties for the
passage of compensation. Although not explicitly passing judg107. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 483
(1969); Owens v. Russell, 277 F. Supp. 390 (M.D. Pa. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1003
(1969); People v. Wells, 261 Cal. App. 2d 468, 68 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Ct. App. 1968).
108. 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), rev'd, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd,
393 U.S. 483 (1969).
109. 378 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1967).
110. 282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969).
111. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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ment with respect to any particular alternative program for assistance, the Court acknowledged that three models currently existed: paid public defenders, law student clinics,112 and voluntary
assistance by the members of the local bar association. By contrast, the mere provision of a notary service and a permissive
attitude toward correspondence with local attorneys were held
113
insufficient.
Since Johnson v. Avery, blanket prohibitions against inmate
assistance have been struck down regularly upon its authority.'
Some cases, while not disputing the authority of Johnson v.
Avery, have distinguished it or found that the relief requested lay
outside its mandate. Two cases which dramatically represent the
Pandora's Box which Johnson v. Avery has opened with respect
to what constitutes a sufficient alternative to inmate assistance
are Ayers v. Ciccone" ' and Clements v. Ciccone."' Both emanate
from the same district court, with different judges presiding.
In Ayers Judge Becker held that assistance by social workers
in preparation of legal materials was insufficient because of delays and failure to respond to requests for assistance by inmates;
and furthermore that a program of legal assistance by senior law
students was insufficient because of the distance involved between the penal facility and the law school. On the other hand,
in Clements, Judge Hunter ruled that assistance given by social
workers was qualitatively at least as adequate as that given by
other inmates, and thus refused to grant relief to the petitioner.1 7
He did not treat the question of the quantitative ability of the
social worker program to give adequate requested assistance in
preparing legal materials. Thus whether a particular program of
112. See United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court opined
that the use of supervised law students would provide the best alternative program for
legal assistance. See also Foggy v. Eyman, 107 Ariz. 532, 490 P.2d 4 (1971).
113. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
114. See, e.g., Beard v. Alabama Board of Corrections, 413 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1969);
Wainwright v. Coonts, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969); Previtt v. Arizona, 315 F. Supp. 793
(D. Ariz. 1970), affd, 418 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1969); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1015
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
115. 303 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
116. 285 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
117. Additionally, Judge Hunter in Clements construed Johnson v. Avery as granting
the right of inmate assistance only when the legal material in question was a petition for
a federal writ of Habeas Corpus and not a motion to vacate a sentence. As discussed
previously the "equal protection" foundation of Johnson v. Avery clearly extends the right
to inmate assistance beyond the statutory foundation in the Federal Habeas Corpus Act.
See also Coonts v. Wainwright, 282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
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legal assistance is adequate or not depends on whether the courts
look at theoretical possibilities as did Judge Hunter, or practical
realities as did Judge Becker. Given the expanding interest of the
courts in correctional affairs, the better rule is probably that of
Judge Becker, since the import of Johnson v. Avery is that the
inmate be able to get assistance if he needs it. The cases demonstrate, however, that judges can differ over factual issues which
are seemingly the same.
Although the Ayers court ruled that the social worker and
law school assistance programs were inadequate, it refused to
strike down the prohibition against inmate assistance because
corrections officials had retained the part-time services of an attorney to render preliminary legal assistance to inmates. Such
programs appeared at that time to be reasonable alternatives to
inmate assistance. In any event, the court clearly left open the
door to challenges based upon the unavailability or inadequacy
of the part-time attorney. Similarly, Beard v. Alabama"' indicated that a state program making available a sufficient number
of qualified attorneys (or other persons capable and willing to
render voluntary legal assistance) would be necessary to justify a
blanket prohibition. But in Novak v. Beto, ' 19 the fifth circuit
rejected as insufficient to justify a blanket prohibition on inmate
assistance a program in which two attorneys, assisted by law
students, were to service 13,000 inmates. In Williams v. United
States,'0 the fifth circuit remanded a case to a district court,
holding that an eighteen month delay between a request for legal
services from a law school clinical program and the time the
service was rendered "is an unreasonable length of time for a
prisoner to wait in order to file a petition for post-conviction
relief,"'"' and thus inferred that a clinic program might not be a
sufficient alternative form of legal assistance to offset the
Johnson v. Avery right to mutual prisoner assistance.
In United States ex rel. Stevenson v. Mancusi'2 the prison
officials attempted to limit inmate assistance to those who
"tested" below a fifth-grade level. The theory advanced by the
118.
119.
1971).
120.
121.
122.

413 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1969).
Novak v. Beto, 320 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.
433 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 960.
325 F. Supp. 1028 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
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prison authorities was that Johnson v. Avery only guaranteed the
right of inmate assistance to illiterate inmates, and the fifthgrade level was the institutional line set for functional illiteracy.
The court was not persuaded, however, that this scheme was not
violative of the Johnson v. Avery standard, and stated: "Any
inmate desirous of legal assistance should have an opportunity to
12 3
receive it under reasonable rules.
Johnson v. Avery made clear, however, that reasonable restrictions might be placed on inmate assistance. The court in
McDonnell v. Wolff, 1 2 approved a prison regulation that permitted inmate assistance for other inmates only upon prior approval
of the administration. While this restriction standing alone may
be suspect under the terms of Johnson v. Avery, the court was
persuaded that it was reasonable in light of an alternative procedure that operated in the prison-a designated inmate who provided assistance to other inmates on a scheduled basis. The prior
restraint on unlimited inmate assistance coupled with the designated inmate assistant program, was found by the court not to
unduly restrict the inmate's access to the courts. The Supreme
25 ruled that
Court of California sitting en banc in In re Harrell,1
a "writ writer" need not be allowed to visit an inmate in isolation,
since the effectiveness of isolation as a punishment would be
severely curtailed by such visitation. Thus, although the rule
might hinder legal assistance, it was a reasonable restriction
under Johnson v. Avery. The court noted, however, that it did not
consider confinement in isolation as wholly preventing inmate
assistance. An inmate may continue to work on materials for an
isolated inmate, and in cases where the filing of papers was necessary, a "next friend" application would be entertained by the
court. Furthermore, the court "presumed" correctional officials
would provide illiterate inmates in isolation with clerical assistance in preparing legal materials or in corresponding with attorneys. Although Harrell gave some consideration to and made
some accomodation for the special problem of inmates in isolation asserting legal complaints, it is possible that these accommodations might prove insufficient. The "next friend application"
remedy relies heavily on the knowledge and altruistic perseverance of other inmates for its success. Providing clerical assistance
123. Id. at 1033.
124. 342 F. Supp. 616 (D. Neb. 1972).
125. 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970).
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presumes that the illiterate inmate is capable of orally verbalizing his complaint, which when transcribed will be nearly as effective as an application or petition prepared by an experienced
writ-writer. None of these presumptions are particularly
supported by demonstrable experience with the ethics or literacy
of inmates. Thus, these "alternatives" to the writ-writer for inmates in isolation may not suffice, especially if the ground for the
complaint is the imposition of isolation, the lengthy term of isolation ' or the inmate's inability to meet filing deadlines during
litigation. A better procedure would appear to be that of the
designated inmate assistant utilized by the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex and approved by the court in McDonnell
v. Wolff.' 7- Inmates in isolation were permitted to visit with the
institution's designated inmate legal assistant for up to one and
three-quarters hours on a designated day, once per week. The
inmate assistant is searched prior to and following admission to
the isolation area. The court ruled that as long as the inmate
assistant was available once per week and no inmate was required
to wait more than three weeks to see the assistant, restrictions on
other inmate assistance were reasonable. Of controlling importance on the court's determination that the prison procedure was
reasonable was the argument that permitting any broader right
of inmate assistance to the inmates in isolation would undermine
the punitive aspects of isolation.
In re Harrell nonetheless remains the case which has most
explored the implications of Johnson v. Avery. The court, commenting that the Supreme Court had not established guidelines
for determining whether a restriction on inmate assistance was
proper or not, proceeded to promulgate the following formula:
We have concluded that the proper determination of this question requires that we measure the extent of restriction against
the need for restriction. The following inquiries are relevant to
this determination: (1) To what extent does the application of
the particular rule have the actual effect of impeding or discour126. Id. The maximum term in California is thirty days, subject to extension only
by affirmative order from the Director of Corrections.
127. 342 F. Supp. 616 (D. Neb. 1972). The court also approved a restriction on the
right of access to inmate legal assistance of newly arrived inmates while they were undergoing orientation and testing. Newly arrived inmates were afforded the same access to
designated assistants as were those in punitive isolation. As a result, the court termed the
delay that might result in obtaining assistance to be minimal and thus not a meaningful
denial of the right of access to the courts.
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aging mutual prisoner assistance? (2) From the standpoint of
legitimate custodial objectives, how undesirable is the conduct
sought to be avoided by the particular rule? (3) Are there reasonable alternative means of dealing with the undesirable conduct which do not entail so significant a restriction upon mutual
prisoner assistance? When these factual questions have been
answered we then must proceed to determine whether the extent
of limitation is justified in light of the gravity of the undesirable
conduct sought to be avoided and the availability of other measures for dealing with the conduct. If the application of the rule
impedes or discourages mutual prisoner assistance to a significant degree, the burden of justification will be great. If, on the
other hand, the application of the rule results in mere inconvenience to prisoners seeking legal assistance, and there is a clear
institutional reason for the restriction, the rule must be sustained." 8
This is the formula being applied by courts generally in dealing
with complaints concerning infringement of prisoners'
rights-i.e., balancing exercise of the right against legitimate
state interests; recognizing that where the right is restricted the
burden is upon the state to establish the necessity of the restriction and to show that there is no less restrictive alternative to the
challenged regulation which would adequately protect the state
interest. Of course, this balancing takes into account the degree
of the interference with the right vis-A-vis the danger sought to
be avoided by the regulation.
Applying this test in the factual setting in Harrell,the court
ruled that a regulation prohibiting one inmate from possessing
the legal papers or materials of another inmate had "a severe
effect upon the ability of an illiterate or uneducated prisoner to
gain assistance from a more gifted one." '29 This established that
the correctional officials had the burden of justifying the rule.
The officials asserted that the rules were required to reduce the
chances of an inmate assistant's withholding papers in order to
extort money and the dangers of violent reprisals following the
potential negligent loss or damage of legal papers by the inmate
assistant. The court found these to be "substantial concerns
[and] custodial officials must not be prevented from taking ac128. 2 Cal. 3d at 686, 470 P.2d at 646, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
129. Id. at 687, 470 P.2d at 647, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
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tion against them." 3 ' However, the court concluded that direct
punishment of an extortive writ-writer or an inmate who destroys
or damages legal papers of another was a less restrictive alternative that would adequately preclude the asserted dangers. Thus
the regulation was held to be invalid as an unreasonable restriction on a prisoner's right to mutual assistance. 3 '
In addition to challenging this regulation, the petitioner also
attacked regulations which prohibited him from "representing"
inmates, from filing documents on behalf of other inmates, from
corresponding regarding legal matters with inmates at other
correctional facilities, from interviewing an inmate in isolation,
from obtaining disciplinary records of inmates at the institution,
and from maintaining a personal law library. But before detailing
the court's response to these challenges it should be explained
that the right to inmate assistance does not refer to the right of
the writ-writer to operate, but rather refers to the right of the
illiterate and uneducated inmate to have assistance in preparing
his legal materials. The reason these cases are often brought by
writ-writers and entertained by the courts is because an inmate
may be incapable of asserting his rights (as is an uneduated or
illiterate inmate who is unable to challenge a restriction because
of his illiteracy) and therefore one who is only collaterally affected
(the writ-writer) may have standing to sue, even though no right
of his own is directly in issue.' 31 '. Thus an extortive writ-writer,

upon proper, specific facts, may be prevented from operating
since he has no right to operate per se. Only when the writ-writer
is the only inmate capable or willing to provide assistance would
the question arise as to whether or not other inmates were being
denied their right to inmate assistance by restraining the writwriter from aiding them. Of course, all blanket restrictions are
automatically suspect on this score.
With this in mind, the complaints of the petitioner in In re
Harrell take on a different cast than they might otherwise. The
court held that the petitioner writ-writer had no "right" to file
papers for another. The inmate who cannot sign or verify papers
130. Id.
131. But see Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The same regulation was found constitutional if interpreted to prohibit the possession of completed legal
papers of another, thus still allowing the assisting inmate to work on them in his cell.
131.1. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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has a right to have them filed by another, but it must be clear
that the inmate was unable to sign or verify papers himself before
this right can be asserted for him by the writ-writer. Thus, a
general prohibition against filing papers for another was permissible, subject to relaxation for exceptional circumstances where a
"next friend application" would be necessary to vindicate rights
of the assisted inmate. Similarly, the petitioner had no right to
"represent" another inmate, since the court found that Johnson
v. Avery only contemplated assistance, not representation, and
thus a regulation forbidding representation would be valid.' 32 (In
McKinney v. DeBord33 a federal court held that an inmate assistant had no protected right to draft a check on his inmate
"client's" account to pay for filing fees, even though the "client"
was in solitary confinement. The court ruled that taking the completed papers to the inmate and allowing him to draft the check
and file the complaint was a reasonable alternative to allowing
his inmate assistant to do it.)
Turning to the demand for correspondence between writwriters in one institution and inmate "clients" in other institutions, the Harrellcourt ruled that the prohibition of such correspondence was a reasonable restriction within the zone permitted
by Johnson v. Avery. The restriction did not operate as a bar to
inmate assistance, since such aid was available from other inmates in the same institution. Consequently, no significant effect
was produced on the right to assistance of the inmates with whom
the petitioner sought to correspond. The reasonable connection
between the regulation and prison discipline and security was
therefore sufficient to uphold it against constitutional attack.
The Harrell court also rejected the petitioner's argument
that restrictions on the number of books allowed in his cell contravened the right of inmate assistance.'34 As noted, the restrictions placed on the writ-writer's activity and possession of materials could infringe the right of other inmates
...only to the extent it is shown that the ability of other
inmates seeking legal assistance is affected. Unless and until it
is demonstrated that other sources of legal assistance ...
132.
133.
134.
135.

can-

Accord, McKinney v. DeBord, 324 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
324 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
Cf. Wilgus v. Peterson, 335 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Del. 1972).
2 Cal. 3d at 690, 470 P.2d at 649, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
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not provide assistance to disadvantaged inmates, the state of
any inmate's personal library is of no significance.'35
IV.

REGULATING POSSESSION OF LEGAL MATERIALS

Regulations restricting the acquisition and possession of legal
materials by inmates, or regulating the time and place of working
on legal materials, have been the target of many attacks-most
of which have, until recently, been unsuccessful. In sharp contrast to these cases is Bailleaux v. Holmes'3 which held that,
although the interests of prison security and discipline must be
served, these ends could not be "achieved by stifling the study of
law, where such study is necessary to the effective utilization of
a basic right."'' 7 As a result, the court enjoined the correctional
authorities from prohibiting the possession of law books in the
cells, from prohibiting legal research and writing in the cells, and
from discriminating against legal materials by broad regulations
pertaining to the purchase and possession of printed material in
general.
3
Holmes was reversed, however, by Hatfield v. Bailleaux.' 1
Specifically, the court of appeals held that regulations restricting
the possession of legal materials were reasonable and justified by
the prison policy of discouraging "jailhouse lawyers," since the
rules governing the use of the prison library were adequate to
dispel the allegation that the challenged regulations denied inmates access to the courts. Even had the prison library proved
inadequate:
. . .no constitutional problem would be presented. State authorities have no obligation under the federal Constitution to
provide library facilities and an opportunity for their use to
enable an inmate to search for legal loopholes in the judgment
and sentence under which he is held or to perform services which
only a lawyer is trained to perform. . . .He has no Due Process
right to spend his time in prison or utilize prison facilities in an
effort to discover a ground for overturning a presumptively valid
judgment. '
Although the court of appeal's decision rested upon prior
136.
137.
138.
139.

177 F. Supp. 361 (D.Ore. 1969), rev'd, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 363.
290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
Id. at 640-41.
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pronouncements of other courts on the subject, 4 " Hatfield v.
Bailleaux became the landmark case in this area until the advent
of Johnson v. Avery. Hatfield provided the conceptual and persuasive authority for a number of cases which approved institutional regulations that inter alia, restricted legal research and
preparation to a "writ room";' set a maximum limit on the
number of law books an inmate could possess at one time;' supported the refusal of state officials to furnish law books to inmates;1 restricted the sources of legal materials to only those
approved by the prison administrators;' prohibited correspondence with law publishers and the possession of law books in cells;
prohibited a prisoner from purchasing used law books," 5 from
typing his own materials" 6 and from retaining his collection of
law books upon entry into the prison;'4 7 and allowed confiscation
of an inmate's law books found in another inmate's cell."" Of
course there were exceptions to this trend, but they were truly
special cases.'
Among the reasons asserted by correctional officials to support the necessity of restrictions on personal law libraries, legal
work in cells, and sources of books were space limitations, fire
hazards, and smuggling problems. Above all, however, the most
relied-upon justification for these restrictions was the necessity to
discourage writ-writers from aiding other inmates in the preparation of their legal materials. Of course, since Johnson v. Avery
this reasoning has been constitutionally deficient, and to the ex140. Seigal v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950); In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279
P.2d 24 (1955); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1961).
141. Edmunson v. Harris, 239 F. Supp. 359 (W.D. Mo. 1965); Ex parte Wilson, 235
F. Supp. 988 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
142. People v. Matthews, 46 Misc. 2d 1024, 261 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
143. Barber v. Page, 239 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Pa. 1965), rev'd, 355 F.2d 171 (10th Cir.
1966).
144. Roberts v. Peppersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
877 (1967); Henson v. Myers, 244 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
145. Lockhart v. Prasse, 250 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
146. Young v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 1008 (M.D. Pa. 1966); Accord, Durham v. Blackwell, 409 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1969); Williams v. United States, 433 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1970).
147. Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 966 (1966).
148. United States ex rel. Duronio v. Russell, 256 F. Supp. 479 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
Accord, In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d 200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1967).
149. DeWitt v. Paul, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993
(4th Cir. 1966); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1969); Brown v. South Carolina,
286 F. Supp. 998 (D.S.C. 1968); United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Prasse, 225 F. Supp.
752 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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tent that cases rely upon the need to restrain writ-writers, they
are no longer the best law. To the extent, however, that they rely
upon the other reasons for the restrictions, they continue to be
sound.
By and large, most cases have relied upon the Hatfield
concept that there exists no inmate right to possess legal material
or to acquire a legal education. Although Johnson v. Avery did
not directly deal with this point, it is difficult to escape the logic
that if an inmate has the right to the assistance of another inmate
in the preparation of legal material, he cannot be absolutely restrained from acquiring the requisite knowledge to assist himself
in the preparation of his petitions and applications. To reason
otherwise would be effectively to grant writ-writers an in-prison
monopoly on legal knowledge to which inmates must resort for
the effective presentation of their complaints. Some post-Johnson
v. Avery cases have successfully avoided this issue by the "bootstrap" approach utilized in many of the access-to-the-court
cases. "' The fact that the petitioner's papers were adequately
bristled with citations demonstrated conclusively to the court
that the regulations prohibiting him from taking legal materials
to his cell and restricting his access to the prison library had not
unduly restricted his access to the courts.'5 1 This approach, of
course, begs the question, since it does not reach the issue of the
chilling effect of such regulations on inmates with less persistence
who might otherwise have been unable to secure relief.
In re Harrell' considered the issue of prisoner access to and
use of law books more fully. The posture of the case was an attack
against regulations limiting personal "libraries" to sixteen hardbound books and restricting sources of books to those approved
by the officers of the correctional institution. The former regulation was challenged on the grounds that it prohibited the petitioner from possessing sets of legal materials, notably the Lawyers
Edition Supreme Court Reporter and the Supreme Court
Digest-atotal of forty-two volumes and a total likely to increase
in the process of keeping the sets up to date. A request for these
books had initially been approved, but was cancelled when the
150. Rails v. Wolfe, 321 F. Supp. 867 (D. Neb. 1971); State v. Ragen, 76 Wash. 2d
331, 457 P.2d 1016 (1969).
151. See also, Cruz v. Beto, 329 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1970), afi'd, 445 F.2d 801
(5th Cir. 1971).
152. 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970).
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authorities became aware of the number of books involved. However, the prison officials would permit the petitioner to have sixteen at one time, and to exchange them for others as needed
through correspondence with his mother. In the alternative, the
officials would permit the petitioner to donate the entire set of
books to the library, where they would be even more accessible
to him. The court found that the reason for the sixteen book limit
was the lack of available space in the individual cells, and thus
the rule was not intended to prevent an inmate from reading law.
Furthermore, the willingness of the prison officials to make the
books available to the petitioner within the limits of the custodial
circumstances led the court to conclude that the restriction was
reasonable. 5 3
The regulation restricting the source of printed material (including law books) to those approved by the institution was also
found reasonable in the light of the threat of smuggling. However,
if non-prohibited reading matter (including law books) could not
be obtained from the approved sources, the court indicated that
a different question would be presented, and the regulation might
fail. Thus it would appear that regulations on inmate law libraries reasonably related to the preservation of prison security and
discipline will be able to withstand constitutional attack as long
as (1) the reason or effect of the rule is not to prevent inmates
from reading the law and (2) reasonable alternative measures are
available for inmates to acquire and read legal material.
Personal "law libraries" are generally unavailable to the indigent inmate, who cannot afford expensive law reporters, digests
and treatises. For him the only recourse is a writ-writer or the
prison library. The Hatfield approach that no inmate has a right
to engage in legal research, led to the courts' approval of restrictions on the use and content of prison libraries. In Bailleaux v.
Holmes'54 the court had been confronted with a prison law library
that consisted of two volumes of a legal encyclopedia, a copy of
the criminal sections of the state code and some advance sheets
from the state supreme court. The court inferentially ruled that
the library was insufficient and would not justify the imposition
of restrictions on legal study-especially since inmates were limited in theory to access to the library, and delays of up to seven153. Accord, McKinney v. DeBord, 324 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
154. 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
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teen days had been experienced. By the time that Hatfield reversed this ruling, the capacity and content of the library had
increased; delays of no longer than one day were experienced in
its use; it contained the United States Constitution Annotated,
nine volumes of a legal encyclopedia covering the areas of Evidence, Criminal Law, Constitutional Law and Witnesses; the titles of the state code dealing with writs, criminal procedure and
criminal law; and the advance sheets of the state supreme court.
Arrangements for prisoners in segregation to have access to legal
material in their cells had been made. These circumstances were
a substantial underpinning of the court's ruling that the inmates
had not been denied access to the courts.
The general language of Hatfield gave support, however, to
broader restrictions on the use of the library and a general refusal
of the courts to inquire into the sufficiency of the library for legal
research."' Johnson v. Avery made this approach to the problem
of content and use of prison libraries for legal research suspect.
This is especially true if prison regulations allow relatively affluent inmates to purchase and possess even limited legal materials.
The Johnson v. Avery dictum that inmates have a right to legal
assistance, coupled with an express dissatisfaction with a system
that consistently discriminates against indigents in such an important area as access to the courts, is highly persuasive.
The Harrell court, in reacting to a challenge to the adequacy
of a prison library for effective legal research, stated it this way:
Several decisions of this court [as well as Hatfield v. Bailleaux]
have indicated in positive terms that inmates in the state prison
system have no legally enforceable rights to engage in legal research except insofar as much research is necessary to insure
access to the courts. .

.

. That standard, which conceptually

begs the question asked of it, has nevertheless been applied to
sustain

. .

. [rules] forbidding mutual prisoner assistance...

and has operated to repel constitutional attack against various
regulations effectively limiting prisoner access to legal material
We cannot fail to recognize, however, that

. .

.Johnson v.

Avery heralds the advent of new principles governing the question of prisoner access to legal material. .

.

. Moreover we are

155. Haughey v. Rhay, 300 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wash. 1969); Henson v. Myers, 244

F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Barber v. Page, 239 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Okla. 1965), rev'd,
355 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1966); State v. Ragen, 76 Wash. 2d 331, 457 P.2d 1016 (1969).
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cognizant that the principles of Johnson may, in a proper case,
require a judicial assessment of the adequacy of prison libraries
to permit legal research of a certain minimum degree of effectiveness. This court itself has recognized that some kind of access to legal materials is necessary to the preparation of an
effective application for relief. "[A]Ithough [an application]
should ordinarly be predicated on a full and honest statement
of the facts which the inmate believes give rise to a remedy, . . . the relevance of certain facts may not be apparent to
him until he has done some legal research on the point."'' 1
The Supreme Court of California is not alone in its concern

over the content of prison libraries, as Gilmore v. Lynch' 7 indicates. A three-judge district court was empaneled to hear challenges to the California Department of Corrections regulations
governing the content of the prison library and mutual inmate
assistance.15 8 Specifically, the inmates attacked a regulation
which limited the content of any prison library to:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

The state penal code

The state welfare and institutions code
The state health and safety code
The state vehicle code
The United States and state constitutions
A law dictionary
A text on state criminal procedure
A subscription to a weekly digest of state cases
Rules of state courts
Rules of the United States Court of Appeals
Rules of the United States Supreme Court.

In addition to this regulation, the director of the Department of
Corrections had issued a letter stating that "all existing law books
and references in inmate law libraries not consistent with this
section are to be removed and destroyed."'59 The plaintiffs argued
156. 2 Cal. 3d at 695, 470 P.2d at 652-53, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17.
157. 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (three judge court), aff'd sub nom., Younger
v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
158. Gilmore ruled that the regulation which permitted inmate assistance but prohibited the assisting inmate from possessing legal materials pertaining to his benefactor
was constitutionally valid as long as it was "interpreted to bar only storage of completed
legal papers in the cell of persons to whom they do not pertain." But In re Harrelldeclared
the regulation invalid as an unreasonable hindrance on the right to mutual prisoner
assistance.
159. This restriction was theoretically mollified by the fact that the state library
would make available to inmates copies of the state and federal reporter systems and
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that these regulations denied indigent inmates and their inmate
assistants the legal expertise which was necessary if access to the
courts is to be in any way meaningful.
The court first ruled that the right of access to the courts
. . . encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner
might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all
charges brought against him or grievances alleged by him ...
[Further, under Johnson v. Avery] some provisions must be
made to ensure that prisoners have the assistance necessary to
file petitions and complaints which will in fact be fully considered by the courts. 6
The state has many alternatives, but in this case, the one chosen
discriminated against indigent inmates by allowing affluent inmates to possess any legal material they desired subject to space
limitations and by restricting the contents of the prison library
(the source of legal material for indigents). As a result the right
of access to the court for indigent inmates was seriously infringed
upon.
In answer to the state's contention that an extensive law
library was not necessary to gain access to the courts, and thus
permitting affluent inmates to purchase books did not affect the
right held by indigents, the court noted:
[T]his court takes notice that more than simple "facts"
are needed in order to file an adequate petition for relief by way
of habeas corpus. A prisoner should know the rules concerning
venue, jurisdiction, exhaustion of remedies, and proper parties
respondent. He should know which facts are legally significant
and merit presentation to the Court, and which are irrelevant
or confusing. When the Return is filed it is never without abundant citations to legal authority, and a proper traverse must
take cognizance of these points. No attorney filing a habeas
petition omits a statement of points and authorities or neither
does the State's attorney in responding to one. Johnson v. Avery
. . . has explicitly recognized the relevance of legal expertise to
supplements and amendments to the code. The court indicated that this supplemental
source was insufficient since (1) only one copy of each volume was available to service
30,000 inmates, and (2) many volumes had been lost or stolen and had not been replaced-e.g., nearly one-fourth of the United States Reports were no longer available. 319
F. Supp. at 107, n.4.
160. 319 F. Supp. at 110.
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the filing of petitions in habeas corpus [citing the Johnson rational for the right of mutual prisoner assistance]."1
As to the state's argument that the interests of economy and
standardization countervailed any infringement of the indigent
inmate's rights, the court held that such interests have never
prevailed in cases in other areas where the rights of indigents had
been curtailed. Citing Judge (now Justice) Blackmun's rejection
of such an argument in Jackson v. Bishop12 to justify the use of
the strap as a disciplinary measure the Gilmore court held:
. . . the fundamental inadequacy of the restricted book list here
[is not] relieved by the fact that California authorities have
succeeded in "standardizing" the law libraries in all of that
63
State's institutions.
The court never reached the questions of whether or not the
interests served by the regulations were compelling, or whether
the infringement of the right was the minimum necessary to
achieve the interest, or whether there existed less restrictive alternatives. In short, the court held that the library restriction infringed the right of access to the court enjoyed by indigent inmates, and concluded that no valid state interest was served by
the regulation. Therefore, it enjoined the enforcement of the regulation.
But merely removing any restrictions on the content of the
law library does not in any meaningful way alleviate the problems
of gaining access to legal material for indigent inmates. The indigent inmates were still quite far from any legal resources, and the
underlying problem still remained. The correctional authorities
were thus ordered to formulate an affirmative program to equalize the circumstances between affluent and indigent inmates in
regard to access to legal material. The court left the formulation
of this program to correctional authorities, but noted that there
were many alternatives from which to choose under the doctrine
of Johnson v. Avery. In addition to these alternatives, the correctional officials could raise the level of the content of the libraries
so as substantially to do away with the current advantage of the
affluent inmates. No explicit guides were given to the department
161. Id.
162. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
163. 319 F. Supp. at 112.
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if the last alternative were chosen, but by way of commenting on
the deficiencies of the present libraries, the Gilmore court indicated its ideas of what might be necessary:
The basic codes and references authorized for prison use
under [the] regulation . . . would offer meager fare to a criminal lawyer. There are no annotated codes, no United States
Reports [cases of the Supreme Court of the United States], no
federal reports [cases of the Courts of Appeals and the District
Courts], no . . .[state] reports. There are unannotated versions of four of [the state's] codes, but there is no copy of any
part of the United States Code. There are copies of the rules of
the [state] . . . and certain federal courts, but there is no
edition of the Rules of the Federal District Courts, which receive
a great many of the habeas corpus petitions and all of the civil
rights petitions filed by . . . [state] prisoners. There is one
copy of [a text on state] criminal procedure, but there are no
other law books or journals such as "U.S. Law Week" [a weekly
national reporter of new legal developments and recent United
States Supreme Court opinions], on the list.1"
Furthermore, in discussing the deficiencies in the state library
collection available to inmates the court stated that an inmate's
ability to do rudimentary legal research "is hindered, to say the
least, by the lack of any lists of parallel citations in either the
prison or on the State Law Library Prison List."
Of course, the purchase of all this legal material as well as
the annual cost of keeping it up to date would amount to a substantial item in the budget of any department of corrections; but,
it is likely to be as cheap as any suitable alternative. Given that
correctional facilities are presently generally underfinanced, it
may be difficult to see the acquisition of an expensive law library
as a high-priority item. It may not be when viewed in that fashion. But what Gilmore and to some extent In re Harrell are announcing is that the state has an affirmative burden to provide
inmates with the basic necessities of legal care, similar to the
long-recognized burden to provide basic medical care, even
though it is expensive. The law library may be the functional
equivalent of a prison hospital in this analogy. This attitude is
apparent from one phrase of the Gilmore opinion: ". . . satisfying
the legal need of its [the Department of Corrections] charges."' 65
164. Id. at 110.
165. Id. at 112.
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When viewed from this perspective, perhaps the expense can be
justified. 66
Of course, a sterling law library is of little use if the inmates
are not given adequate time with which to utilize its contents.
Following the lead of Hatfield, nearly all restrictions, including
outright prohibitions on the use of library facilities as an incident
of punishment, have been upheld by the courts." 7 Since Johnson
v. Avery, however, a re-examination of this practice has become
necessary. The beginning of such a re-examination was made in
McDonnell v. Wolff.' The court there dealt with what the parties
had stipulated to be an adequate law library. In issue were regulations that restricted library use to no more than six persons at a
time, that restricted library-hours to certain times that conflicted
with other inmate educational programs, and that prohibited
inmates in isolation from having direct access to library facilities.
While the court found little difficulty in finding that the needs
of prison security justified the six-man restriction by preventing
large numbers of prisoners from congregating in one place, the
other two restrictions did not fare as well.
The library schedule called for independent legal research to
be done from 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. three days per week, and from
6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. the remaining two days. Education classes,
which were mandatory for some inmates, conflicted with these
library hours and, thus, serious restrictions were placed on independent legal research by many of the inmates. The court found
that the limitations bore no reasonable relation to the time
needed for such research and that no compelling state interest
was served by such limited library hours. As a result the court
ordered the prison officials to modify the time restrictions, and
suggested that a rule be adopted allowing inmates access to the
law library during any "free time" periods.
The court also found the practice of banning inmates in particular sections of the institution (punitive segregation) from having access to the library to be unreasonable on its face. At the
time of the decision, however, the prison authorities had already
set about to modify the regulation by assigning inmate legal assistants and by creating a small legal library in the unit. Without
166. For a list of contents which, with one exception, was agreed to be sufficient, see
McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 618, Appendix A at 629 (D. Neb. 1972).
167. See, e.g., In re Allison, 66 Cal. 2d 282, 425 P.2d 193, 57 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1967).
168. 342 F. Supp. 616 (D. Neb. 1972).
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an inquiry into the adequacy of the unit's library facility, the
court was unable to determine whether the regulation was in fact
unreasonable. It would seem, however, that unless the two libraries were virtually identical, or that procedures existed for ready
access through book transfers or loans, the satellite library system
proposed by the prison authorities would not be a satisfactory
alternative. Unless such equalizing conditions prevailed, an inmate's right of access to the courts through the medium of a pro
se application supported by research would, in effect, seem to be
curtailed depending upon the inmate's classification within the
institution. As previously indicated, an inmate's classification
bears little, if any, relation to his need to proceed in court. If any
need exists, it may in fact be directly proportional to the severity
of the classification. Unless substantial parity between inmates
of differing units of a penal institution is achieved with respect
to access to state supplied legal material, there would appear to
be violations of both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
V.

REGULATING ATTORNEY VISITATION

The right of an accused to consult with his attorney in jail
was early recognized in statutes'69 and judicial opinion.7 0 There
have been few recent decisions relating to the right of a convicted
inmate to consult with an attorney, probably because most
correctional facilities allow such visitation fairly liberally.17 '
Those few cases which have dealt with visitation rights revolve
about the incidents of the right.
In Kahn v. LaVallee7 an attorney wrote to the warden of
an institution stating that she wished to interview thirty-four
inmates within the space of one-and-one-half days. There was no
mention of a retainer and the purpose of the interviews was not
indicated. The warden made arrangements for the visit, but stationed a guard in the interview room within earshot of the discussions. The attorney sought an order compelling the warden to
169. See, e.g., McPhail v. Delaney, 48 Colo. 411, 110 P. 64 (1910), and Farrell v. Hood,
32 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Cir. App. 1930) [statutes imposing quasi-criminal and criminal
sanctions on jailkeepers who refused to allow attorney consultations].
170. Wilmans v. Harston, 234 S.W. 233 (Tex. Cir. App. 1921); Farrell v. Hood, 32
S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Cir. App. 1930).
171. See, e.g., McClelland v. State, 4 Md. App. 18, 240 A.2d 769 (1968).
172. 12 App. Div. 2d 832, 209 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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allow inmates to confer privately with her. Shocked by the broad
scope of the attorney's request, the court held that the interviews
were properly subjected to scrutiny "in order to insure against
'1
any impropriety or infractions of prison rules and regulations. '
However, the court continued,
We are quite sure that upon a reasonable request for interviews at reasonable intervals, upon a proper showing of a retainer, a private interview would be arranged by the warden, even
in connection with a post-conviction relief proceeding. While we
are not now reaching or deciding herein the question of whether
in a proper case the court would order a warden to allow a
private interview in a post-conviction remedy case, it would
seem that the same justifications for a private interview exist
(although there appears to be no authority for same) as in those
cases where the petitioner is an accused, and is facing trial.,"
It is indisputable that the accused has a right to private
consultation as an incident to the right to counsel. 7 5 However, in
United States v. White"6 the court ruled that there was no authority for dismissing an indictment against an accused on the
basis of his being compelled to consult with counsel in a crowded
visiting room. Although the remedy requested was a bit drastic
for the situation, the case does indicate that the facilities need not
be absolutely private. 7 It would appear to be sufficient in the
ordinary case that the conversations between attorney and client
are not monitored by the authorities.
Konigsberg v. Ciccone7 1 serves as an example in which monitoring of vocal communications between an inmate and his attorney might be upheld. The inmate was being held at the United
States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. He had made approximately twenty telephone calls to his
173. Id., 209 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
174. Id.
175. See Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1382 (1923); Annot., 54 A.L.R. 1225 (1928).
176. 295 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
177. See People v. Del Rio, 207 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. Co. Gen. Sess. 1960). The court
stated with respect to an accused:
The right of an accused to consult with his attorney is not without limitation.
There is no duty on the warden. . . to provide a room beyond the need required
for consultation . .

.

.It is only necessary that reasonable facilities be provided

and that the right of privacy between the accused and his attorney be respected.
Id.at 189.
178. 285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
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out-of-state attorneys. During these calls, a social worker was
present, observing the inmate's emotional condition during these
conversations. During five of these calls the social worker was
close enough to overhear one end of the conversation and on those
occasions the worker entered the general content of the conversations in the inmate's record. There was no electronic surveillance
of the calls. The inmate alleged that his right of private communication with counsel had been infringed. The court found that
the entries in the record were of a medical nature and not intended to glean confidential information between attorney and
client, thus rejecting the inmate's contention. It would appear
from this case that, in limited circumstances, the rehabilitative
interest might serve to justify a non-intrusive observation of visits
between inmates and their attorneys. On the other hand, in
Collins v. Schoonfield,18 the court held that the facilities provided for inmate-attorney consultations were inadequate to preserve the protected confidentiality of the communications since
guards were often within hearing distance of the attorney and his
client. Since no justification was offered for such an intrusion, the
court, unlike the Konigsberg court, found the facilities to be constitutionally deficient.
Konigsberg also held that visits by attorneys may be interrupted by demands of prison regimen such as fixed meal times.
This is supportive of the general concept that the time and place
of inmate consultation with attorneys may be governed by reasonable regulations as long as they do not work a hardship on the
inmates or his attorney.'80 Similarly Elie v. Henderson1 ' held that
reasonable restrictions such as individual as opposed to group
meetings with multiple clients, alternative sites for interviewing
clients as necessitated by security needs, and requiring that a
request on the part of the inmate to see an attorney be shown.
The latter restruction-that an inmate's request be a condition
precedent to an attorney visitation-is probably unsound as a
blanket rule since, as the Elie court indicated:
Access as complete as possible should be given an inmate to his
attorney. Any restrictions placed thereon must1 2be reasonable
and justified under the existing circumstances. 1
179. 344 F. Supp. 1119 (D.N.H. 1971).
180. See Negrich v. Ham, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967); People v. Del Rio, 207
N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. Co. Gen. Sess. 1960).
181. 340 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. La. 1972).
182. Id. at 968.
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1 3 held that time restrictions placed
In fact, Collins v. Schoonfield"
on attorney visitations, generally regarded as constitutionally
permissible, were, in that case, too restrictive to allow for adequate assistance by counsel. The specific defect in the restriction
was the scheduling of time for attorney visitations so that they
conflicted with the hours the courts were in session. As a result
attorneys with current trials were precluded from consulting with
their clients in prison.
Another incident of the right to consult with counsel enjoyed
by accused persons is the right to consult with agents of the
attorney, or experts retained by him. 84' This right has recently
been extended to convicted inmates,8 5 and under the dictum of
Kahn v. La Vallee"' it is difficult to see under what circumstances it could be denied. In the case of an accused, a prison regulation that inmates could not be visited by convicted felons was
invoked to bar a visit to an inmate by an investigator sent by the
inmate's attorney. The court rejected this blanket approach to
the situation:

The rule restricting jail visits by felons does not appear to
be unreasonable. But the authority of the sheriff is not so absolute as to prevail against the defendant's right to prepare his
defense. The choice of an investigator lies with defense counsel.
There has been no showing by the prosecution that the investigator's visits cannot be so handled as to avoid endangering security. In the absence of such a showing, the investigator must be
accorded reasonable visitation privileges with [the inmate] for
the purpose of preparing the defense's case. If the privilege is
abused, the prosecution has the recourse of seeking a protective
order from the trial court .... 187
Thus the court held that although the regulation served a legitimate state interest, it could not stand since it was not the least
restrictive alternative means of serving that interest. If this area
is to be the subject of further litigation, the courts will probably
resolve doubtful questions by recourse to the well-developed law
183. 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972).
184. Clifton v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 245, 86 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct' App. 1970);
Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959) (en banc). See also People
v. Del Rio, 207 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. Co. Gen. Sess. 1960).
185. Arif v. McGrath, 10 CRIM. L. Rrm. 2278 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1971).
186. 12 App. Div. 2d 832, 209 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
187. Clifton v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 245, 86 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1970).
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of the right to counsel of accused persons, unless the correctional
officials can establish that a substantial threat to prison discipline or security would result thereby. The right of an accused to
consult with counsel includes the right to a reasonable time and
place for private consultation as well as the right to consult with
counsel's assistants or experts concerning the inmate's case, absent a showing of abuse.
Viewing the problem from another perspective, counsel does
not necessarily have free access to consult with prisoners whom
he does not represent. Although no issue can be taken to the
general proposition, a threshold question may be presented when
a determination is made that an attorney does, in fact, "represent" an inmate. It has not as yet been made clear at what point
the attorney-inmate-client relationship begins, but a formal retainer agreement is probably not necessary to establish the relationship. For example, if an attorney should arrive at a penal
institution to interview an inmate at the request of a family member, in response to a letter from an inmate, or even on his own
initiative, it would be contrary to the concerns of the indigent
inmate as expressed in Johnson v. Avery for the prison authorities
to turn him away. Even if the inmate has an attorney of record,
a refusal to allow a visit by different counsel may violate the
inmate's right of access to the courts through counsel, if one of
the grounds for post-conviction relief is incompetency of one's
prior counsel. Since the inmate may wish to change counsel (as
is his right within the discretion of the court) and because correctional officials are not the guardians of the ethics of the bar, they
should not therefore deny admission to the "stranger" attorney
on the grounds that it would be "unethical" absent a showing
that the particular attorney has engaged in illegal conduct on
prior occasions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The right of access to the courts, although not explicitly
stated in the Constitution, in an inferable right, and one which
is carefully guarded by the courts as being fundamental. The
most absolute form of denying an inmate's access to the courts is
the refusal by officials to mail court-directed letters. This practice has been uniformly prohibited as a denial of access to the
courts. Most charges of denial of access to the courts, however,
are not based on absolute refusals by institutional authorities to
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss4/10
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mail letters, but rather on restrictive institutional regulations
which preclude or hinder effective or meaningful communications
with the court. In the past the court's traditional "hands off"
policy treated these restrictive regulations as being within the
discretionary domain of prison authorities and thus unassailable
in the courts. As a result, the inmates were directed by the courts
to take their complaints to prison officials. At present the courts
appear to be shifting from reliance on the "hands off" doctrine
and are subjecting restrictive penal regulations to closer scrutiny.
While some courts retain much of the "hands off" reasoning,
a new trend is developing and its impact is being felt among the
emerging rights of the confined. Although the ultimate resolution
of the problems concerning inmates and their right of access to
courts and counsel has not yet been achieved, certain principles
are discernible. Inmate mail to courts may not be intercepted or
censored as to any criticism about correction officials or facilities.
In the future, inmate mail to the courts may not be subject to any
restrictions, including censorship. As a corollary, inmate mail to
public officials is to be treated in the same manner as courtdirected mail. Inmate-attorney mail must not be intercepted and
probably should not be censored, although it may be subjected
to reasonable inspection procedures. Inmate mail to service organizations in an attempt to secure assistance in instituting court
proceedings should be treated in the same manner as mail to
attorneys. At the same time it should be recognized that mail
which seeks "legal assistance" is being conceptually broadened
by the courts to include not only assistance of counsel, but that
seeking financial assistance, expert witnesses or merely information relating to the inmates case.
Despite the liberalizing trend in affording inmates an unhampered access to courts,prison officials still retain the power
to punish individual abuses of mailing rights upon a factual showing that the mailing rights are being used for improper purposes.
Additionally, regulations affecting the incidents of the right of
access to the courts may be imposed on inmates subject to the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, reasonable regulations as to time, place and duration of legal assistance
by inmates may be imposed by prison officials. Such regulations
must be necessitated by a compelling state interest and must not
have a substantial chilling effect on the right of indigent inmates
to receive legal assistance. Reasonable regulations limiting the
possession of legal material by inmates may be upheld by the
Published by Scholar Commons, 1973
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courts; in each case, such regulations are subject to equal protection guarantees. Prison officials, in any event, must take affirmative action to supply alternative methods to enable inmates to
achieve meaningful access to the courts. Prison libraries must be
sufficient to allow an inmate to research the points of law and
procedure applicable to his case. Reasonable opportunity must be
given inmates to confer conveniently with counsel or any of his
lay assistants. Although definitive delineations of what restrictive
regulations are reasonable probably depend on the specific facts
of each case, it can be said that blanket proscriptions affecting
an inmate's access to court without provision of reasonable alternatives will not be allowed.
It is almost too elemental to bear recitation, but as a corollary of the rights of inmates of access to courts, no punishment
may be visited upon inmates for the assertion and utilization of
those rights.'85 To allow otherwise would be to allow prison officials to do indirectly what they could not do directly-namely
inhibit free access through threat of reprisal. Nor can restrictions
of an inmate's freedom of access to the courts be used as punishment itself. Restriction on these rights might be justified according to the classification of the inmate, but this is becoming a
doubtful procedure unless some clear factual basis of danger exists to support the distinctions. In any event, any such restrictions incidental to classification must not be of substantial impact, of long duration, unnecessary, or imposed for their disciplinary value.' 9
188. Andrade v. Hanck, 452 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.
Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States ex rel. Diamond v. Social Services Dept., 263
F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1970).
189. See, e.g., Arey v. Peyton, 378 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1967).
[S]olitary confinement for several weeks . . . may . . . be such an oppressive
and inappropriate response as to amount to undue interference with an inmate's
access to the courts. Id. at 931.
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